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CONTRACTS
I. IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN HOME CONSTRUCTION: SUBSEQUENT
PURCHASERS'
In Terlinde v. Neely,1 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that a subsequent purchaser of a home could maintain an
action against the original builder-vendor for breach of implied
warranties 2 due to latent defects in the construction of the
home.' By extending implied warranty protections to subse-
quent purchasers, the court provided buyers of used homes with
a cause of action for construction defects that closely approxi-
mates the remedies available to a buyer of a new house with
latent defects.
In September 1972, defendants completed construction of a
single-family home that was sold to the Johnsons, the original
purchasers who, three years later, sold the house and lot to
plaintiffs.4 Shortly after purchasing the house, plaintiffs noticed
evidence of substantial settling of the home's foundation. As a
result of the settling, sheetrock walls began to crack, floors sank
away from the walls, doors no longer closed properly, mortar
separated from the exterior brickwork, and the supporting foun-
dation pillars sank away from the floor beams.5 Although some
1. - S.C. , 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980). For additional discussion of the case, see
Property, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 33 S.C.L. REV. 125, 137 (1981); Torts,
Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 33 S.C.L. Rev. 159, 180 n.138 (1981).
2. The theory of implied warranty used by the South Carolina courts appears to be
a combination of warranties of merchantability, fitness, and habitability. See notes 29-40
and accompanying text infra. The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness usu-
ally apply to transactions dealing with the sale of goods. Merchantability requires that
the goods sold "pass without objection in the trade" and be fit for the ordinary purposes
for which they are used. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-314 (1976). Fitness indicates that, at the
time of the sale, the seller knows of any particular purpose for which the goods are being
purchased and the buyer is relying on the seller's skill in making the purchase. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 36-2-315 (1976). Habitability means that the builder has complied with local
building codes and that the residence was built in a workmanlike manner and is suitable
for habitation. Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 39 Colo. App. 92, 563 P.2d 976
(1977).
3. - S.C. at , 271 S.E.2d at 770.
4. Id. at , 271 S.E.2d at 768.
5. Id.
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settling had occurred during the Johnsons' ownership, it was not
comparable to that which occurred after plaintiffs purchased the
home.' Experts hired by plaintiffs determined that the settling
was caused by construction of the house on improperly packed
fill dirt that lacked sufficient load-bearing capacity. Repair esti-
mates ranged from $6,000 to $23,000.
7
Plaintiffs instituted an action against the builders to recover
damages for breach of implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for intended purpose.8 Defendants' motion for summary
judgment was granted by the trial court on grounds that privity
between the parties, a prerequisite to maintaining the action,9
was lacking. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the
lower court, holding that "an implied warranty for latent defects
extends to subsequent home purchasers for a reasonable amount
of time."10 This decision marked a further step in the expansion
of home buyers' remedies for construction defects.
A. Evolution of Home-Buyers' Remedies for Defective
Construction
Prior to World War 11, the doctrine of caveat emptor gov-
erned most sales transactions.11 Consequently, purchasers of
dwellings that subsequently proved to be defective had no re-
dress for their loss other than a suit for breach of contract pre-
mised on failure to do the job in a workmanlike manner.12 After
6. Id. Approximately three months before they sold the house to plaintiffs, the
Johnsons contacted the defendant-builders and informed them that they had detected
some minor settling of the foundation. The Johsons agreed to correct the defects and
were paid the sum of $230.18 by defendants. In return for this payment, the Johnsons
executed a release of all claims against defendants relating to the residence. Id.
7. Id. at , 271 S.E.2d at 768-69.
8. See note 2 supra.
9. -.S.C. at , 271 S.E.2d at 769. But cf. Note, The Demise of Vertical Privity:
Economic Loss Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 749 (1974)
(courts have developed various theories to avoid the privity requirement for breach of
warranty in products liability cases).
10. - S.C. at , 271 S.E.2d at 770.
11. For a thorough discussion of the origin and nature of the doctrine of caveat
emptor, see Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim of Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
Although some states recognized that mass production had an adverse effect on the qual-
ity of goods produced and attempted to offer consumers some protection, see U~n'o!A
SALES AcT §§ 13-16 (1906), transactions in realty continued to follow the caveat emptor
doctrine.
12. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It,
[Vol. 33
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the war, builders began developing large tracts of land into resi-
dential communities, selling homes and lots in single transac-
tions. In an effort to avoid the inequities of the caveat emptor
doctrine, Ohio became the first state to adopt an implied war-
ranty that a "home will be finished in a workmanlike manner"13
but limited application of the warranty to houses still in the
course of construction. In 1967, the Supreme Court of Colorado
extended the implied warranty "to include agreements between
builder-vendors and purchasers for the sale of newly constructed
buildings, completed at the time of contracting."1 5 By 1980, at
least thirty-five state courts had adopted some form of implied
warranty protection for purchasers of new homes.18
The first signal of the South Carolina Supreme Court's rec-
ognition of the trend toward restricting the application of caveat
emptor came in 1968. In Frasher v. Cofer,17 the court noted that
"this rule has been the subject of much criticism."1 8 In the same
year, the court, in Rogers v. Scyphers,19 intimated that caveat
emptor was inapplicable to real estate transactions in which a
builder-vendor conveyed a new home that contained defects.20
Although breach of warranty was not at issue, the court noted
that the purchaser had a potential cause of action against the
52 CORNFLL L.Q. 835, 837 (1967).
13. Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957) (citing Perry
v. Sharon Dev. Co., 4 All. E.L.R. 390 (C.A. 1937)).
14. Id. at 340, 140 N.E.2d at 819.
15. Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
16. Jurisdictions that recognize an implied warranty of habitability are Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. Shedd, The
Implied Warranty of Habitability: New Implications, New Applications, 8 RA EST.
L.J. 291, 308-16 (1980).
Only two states have rejected expressly all forms of implied warranty in real estate
transactions: Georgia in Amos v. McDonald, 123 Ga. App. 509, 181 S.E.2d 515 (1971) and
Virginia in Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, 219 Va. 287, 247 S.E.2d 400 (1978). Tennessee
has indirectly rejected implied warranties. See Shores v. Spann, -Tenn. App. ,
557 S.W.2d 67 (1977). The remaining states have not passed on the issue. Shedd, supra,
at 303-06.
17. 251 S.C. 112, 160 S.E.2d 560 (1968).
18. Id. at 115, 160 S.E.2d at 561.
19. 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968).
20. Id. at 133, 161 S.E.2d at 83. Rogers was a home purchaser's negligence action to
recover damages for personal injuries suffered when an attic stairway collapsed.
19811
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builder-vendor under the theory of implied warranty.21
Relying on the dictum in Rogers, the court held, in Rut-
ledge v. Dodenhoff,22 that "in the sale of a new home by the
builder-vendor, there is an implied warranty that the house was
built in a reasonably workmanlike manner and is reasonably
suitable for habitation. '23 In Rutledge, plaintiffs brought an ac-
tion against a builder-vendor to recover damages caused by a
septic tank that repeatedly overflowed because of improper in-
stallation. 24 Allowing plaintiffs to recover on an implied war-
ranty theory, the court reasoned that the primary purpose of the
transaction was the transfer of a habitable dwelling to the pur-
chaser who, being in an unequal bargaining position, was forced
to rely on the expert skills of the builder to provide such a
dwelling.2 5 In addition, the court noted that the buyer's lack of
construction knowledge and the latent nature of building defects
made proper inspection "practically impossible. '26 The estab-
lishment in Rutledge of builder-vendor liability for construction
defects marked South Carolina's initial participation in the
movement away from the strictures of caveat emptor in realty
transactions.
21. Id. at 134, 161 S.E.2d at 83.
22. 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970), discussed in Contracts, Annual Survey of
South Carolina Law, 23 S.C.L. REV. 513 (1971). The court stated:
In recent years, the efficacy of caveat emptor to accomplish justice, when ap-
plied to the sale of new houses by the builder, has been subjected to serious
question and rejection by many courts in the light of modem developments in
the residential building trade. Distinction has been drawn between the usual,
normal sale of lands, and old buildings and a transaction where the vendor is
also the builder of a new structure. We have recently recognized such distinc-
tion in Rogers v. Scyphers. We there stated that, where the vendor is also the
builder, he is, by the weight of modern authority, held liable for damages and
injuries occurring after the surrender of title and possession, on one or more of
three theories: (1) implied warranty, (2) an imminently dangerous condition
caused by negligence in construction, and (3) concealment or failure to disclose
to the vendee any condition which involves unreasonable risk to the persons on
the land under the conditions set forth in Restatement, Torts (2d), Section
353.
Id. at 413, 175 S.E.2d at 794-95.
23. 254 S.C. at 414, 175 S.E.2d at 795.
24. Id. at 410-11, 175 S.E.2d at 792-93.
25. Id. at 414, 175 S.E.2d at 795.
26. Id. at 414, 175 S.E.2d at 795.
27. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 33
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B. Extension of Liability to the Nonbuilder- Vendor
Remaining in dispute after Rutledge was the question
whether a nonbuilder-vendor also would be liable for construc-
tion defects in an implied warranty action. A nonbuilder-vendor
contracts with a third party for the construction of a home and
then sells the lot and house to the purchaser. The distinction
between the nonbuilder-vendor and the builder-vendor lies in
the latter's special knowledge of construction practices and tech-
niques.28 Although a builder-vendor is familiar with every aspect
of the construction process, a nonbuilder-vendor of completed
homes may have no more knowledge of the intricacies of build-
ing a home that the purchaser.
The South Carolina Supreme Court squarely faced this is-
sue in Lane v. Trenholm Building Co.,29 an action against the
developer of a subdivision to recover damages resulting from a
defective septic tank.30 Finding for plaintiffs, the court deter-
mined that an implied warranty flowed from a nonbuilder-
vendor of a new home to the purchaser and held that "when a
new building is sold there is an implied warranty of fitness for
its intended use which springs from the sale itself. '81 The court
reasoned that in the sale of a new home, as in the sale of a prod-
uct, both parties contemplate its expected use. In order to "carry
out the reasonable expectations of the parties," the court
adopted the civil law doctrine of caveat venditor, which is pre-
mised on the principle that "a sound price warrants a sound
commodity.
'32
28. 254 S.C. at 414, 175 S.E.2d at 795. Several commentators have argued forcefully
that there should be equal treatment of builder-vendors and nonbuilder-vendors, con-
tending that knowledge is not related to the merchantability of a product or a house. See
Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53
GEo. L.J. 633, 649 (1965); McNamara, The Implied Warranty in New-House Construc-
tion Revisited, 3 REAL EST. L.J. 136, 141-42 (1974).
29. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
30. Id. at 497, 229 S.E.2d at 728.
31. Id. at 500, 229 S.E.2d at 729.
32. Id. at 502, 229 S.E.2d at 730. The court compared the remedy in Lane with the
protections created for buyers of goods by the UNwoRm CoMMERCUAL CODE but recog-
nized that the seller might not be a "merchant" within the meaning of S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36-2-104 (1976), and that the buyer, therefore, would be without a remedy. To avoid
this problem, the court reasoned that considerations of uniformity in laws governing
transactions concerning mobile personalty were not relevant to laws governing transac-
tions for the sale of buildings, which are of fixed and local concern. 267 S.C. at 504, 229
S.E.2d at 731.
19811
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C. Extension of the Implied Warranty to Subsequent
Purchasers
Although purchasers of new homes were protected by the
implied warranty, the remedy was unavailable to subsequent
purchasers because of the traditional contractual requirement of
vertical privity. 35 While the privity requirement for liability on
implied warranties had been eliminated in cases concerning the
sale of personalty,s4 transactions concerning realty were viewed
as distinguishable because of the absence of a manufacturing-
distribution process separating purchasers from producers.3 5
In Terlinde, the South Carolina Supreme Court extended
the implied warranty to subsequent purchasers but ruled that a
builder-vendor's liability was limited to latent defects and ex-
tended for a reasonable amount of time following construction.
The court relied on Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co.,86 in which the
Indiana Supreme Court balanced various considerations includ-
ing "the age of the house, its maintenance, [and] the use to
which it has been put,"37 and set forth three justifications for its
decision. First, the South Carolina court recognized that, be-
cause latent construction defects can surface many years after
completion of construction, there is no apparent basis for the
rationale that only first purchasers need warranty protection."
Second, the court reasoned that the builder's "holding out" of
his expertise in the marketplace results in reliance on the part of
all prospective purchasers.3 9 Finally, the court surmised that
limited knowledge prevents a purchaser from discovering con-
33. E.g., Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 307 (1971).
34. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318 (1976).
35. See Brown v. Fowler, - S.D... 279 N.W.2d 907, 910 (1979). In per-
sonalty transactions, strict privity requirements would prevent manufacturers from being
held liable for their defective products because the buyer deals with a middleman rather
than the manufacturer. In realty transactions, however, the buyer has a sales contract
with the "manufacturer" of his home and can proceed against him directly on the con-
tract. See id.
36. 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976).
37. Id. at 227, 342 N.E.2d at 619.
38. - S.C. at ., 271 S.E.2d at 770.
39. Id. at -, 271 S.E.2d at 769. This rationale, adopted from Rutledge, see notes
25 & 26 and accompanying text supra, is consistent with the premise that a home buyer
and builder are in unequal positions in terms of construction knowledge. Because the
typical buyer is ignorant of the details of construction work, he is forced to rely on the
superior knowledge of the builder-vendor when he purchases a home. ._S.C. at
271 S.E.2d at 769.
[Vol. 33
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struction defects, "especially at a time when he is provided more
elaborate furnishings which tend to obscure the structural integ-
rity of the facility.'
40
D. The Uncertain Scope of Implied Warranties as Applied
to Construction Defects
The holding and reasoning of Terlinde are sound, and the
decision resolves two important issues. First, it is now clear that
a subsequent purchaser has a right of action on implied war-
ranty against a builder-vendor. 1 Second, an implied warranty
action against a builder-vendor by a subsequent purchaser lies
only for latent defects.42 Patent defects, discoverable upon rea-
sonable inspection, are not actionable.'
Terlinde's expansion of implied warranties as applied to
construction defects nevertheless leaves the exact scope of the
remedy undefined. Unless clear limitations are placed on build-
ers' liability, consumers will bear the brunt of builders' increased
insurance costs, and small builder-vendors eventually may be
driven out of business." Absent action by the state legislature,
the South Carolina Supreme Court undoubtedly will be faced
with refining and delineating the implications of Terlinde.
1. The Time Limit within which a Subsequent Purchaser
May Bring an Implied Warranty Action.-Perhaps the most
problematic issue left unresolved by Terlinde is "what consti-
tutes a reasonable amount of time' 1 during which a subsequent
purchaser may bring an action against a builder-vendor. Prop-
erly refusing to assume the legislature's prerogative, the court in
Terlinde declined an opportunity to establish an arbitrary stan-
dard limiting the action.'
40. Id. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
41. - S.C. at -, 271 S.E.2d at 768.
42. Id. at , 271 S.E.2d at 770. See Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 792 (1975).
43. See Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d at 796.
44. Note, The New-House Implied Warranty Comes to Illinois-Peterson v. Hubsch-
man Construction Co., 29 DEPAuI L. Rav. 617, 632 (1980); Note, Elderkin v.
Gaster-The Pennsylvania Experience with Implied Warranties in Sales of New
Homes, 47 TEmP. L.Q. 172, 185 (1973).
45. - S.C. at , 271 S.E.2d at 770.
46. Id. at , 271 S.E.2d at 769. The court stated:
We also disagree with the conclusion of the trial judge that an equal bargaining
position existed between the buyer and the builder because three years was
sufficient time for latent defects to come to light. The length of time for latent
1981]
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Development of a suitable limitation period for warranty ac-
tions in South Carolina will require the legislature to balance the
needs of consumers with those of the building industry.47 The
duration of any limitation period should reflect the relatively
long life expectancy of homes 48 and the substantial investment
that a home purchase requires. 49 Additionally, consideration
should be given to creating a limitation system that not only es-
tablishes a reasonable liability ceiling but also recognizes differ-
ent types of construction defects and applies different limitation
periods for each type.50 A system with varied limitation periods
would offer an added element of flexibility, would be more equi-
table, and would help to strike a balance between the competing
needs of builders and consumers. Several states already have en-
acted implied warranty legislation prescribing a limited period,
often one year, during which the remedy is available. 51 Clearly,
short warranty periods fail to take into consideration the
delayed manifestation problem respecting latent construction
defects,52 but there is little agreement among commentators con-
defects to surface, so as to place subsequent purchasers on equal footing should
be controlled by the standard of reasonableness and not an arbitrary time limit
created by the Court.
Id. at -, 271 S.E.2d at 769.
47. See Haskell, supra note 28, at 652-53.
48. Project, A Statutory Approach to Implied Warranties in New Residential Con-
struction, 36 WASH. & LEE L. Ray. 1075, 1082 (1979).
49. 267 S.C. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
50. Young & Harper, Quaere: Caveat Emptor or Caveat Venditor?, 24 Aiu. L. Rzv.
245, 274 (1970). See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-313-1 to -12 (West Supp. 1979). This legisla-
tive package, entitled The New Home Warranty and Builders Registration Act, is a com-
prehensive statutory scheme which requires registration of all contractors and financial
participation in a defect security fund. The length of warranties under the Act ranges
from one year for faulty workmanship to ten years for major construction defects. Major
construction defects are defined as:
any actual damage to the load-bearing portion of the home including actual
damage due to subsidence, expansion or lateral movement of the soil (exclud-
ing movement caused by flood or earthquake) which affects its load-bearing
function and which vitally affects or is imminently likely to vitally affect use of
the home for residential purposes.
Id. § 46:3B-2(g). For a brief discussion of the New Jersey approach, see Note, Builders'
Liability for Latent Defects in Used Homes, 32 STAN. L. REV. 607, 619-20 (1980).
51. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-118(e)(West 1978); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 10-204(b)(1974); VA. CODE § 55-70.1(E)(Supp. 1979). The Connecticut, Maryland, and
Virginia implied warranty periods are each one year from the transfer of title. But see
ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 83 § 22.3(b)(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979)(twelve-year limitation period
running from the time of construction). See generally Project, supra note 48, at 1082-83.
52. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
8
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cerning a proper demarcation period." Another guide can be
found in the uniform legislation packages which govern transac-
tions for the sale of personalty" and realty.5 5 These model acts
agree on a limitation period yet remain flexible because their
broad scope encompasses areas beyond implied warranties.
Should the legislature fail to act promptly, the court will be
forced to fashion its own standard and is likely to be more con-
cerned with the innocence of the purchaser than with his status
as a third, fourth, or fifth owner .5  The development of a mul-
tifactor test similar to that used by the Indiana Supreme Court
in Barnes57 may provide useful short-term guidelines for lower
courts to consider. Without action by the legislature or some
clarification from the courts, the building industry inevitably
will take steps to avoid costly defect litigation."8
2. The Degree of Defectiveness Required to Justify a Sub-
sequent Purchaser's Implied Warranty Action.-Another unan-
swered question is the degree of defectiveness a homeowner
must show to recover under an implied warranty theory.59 A
standard requiring perfection is unattainable in the housing in-
dustry, because specialized contractors often work in piecemeal
fashion to complete the final integrated dwelling.60 A balancing
53. See note 56 infra.
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-725 (1976) limits breach of contract actions with respect
to transactions for the sale of goods to six years. This includes warranty actions from the
time the defect is or should be discovered. Id.
55. UNIFORM LAND TRmSAC ONS ACT § 2-521 also establishes a six-year limitation
period. This model legislation was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and was adopted in 1975. It comprises four articles and encom-
passes contracts to convey real estate. For a discussion of this model act, see Note,
Builders' Liability, supra note 50, at 618-19.
56. Haskell, supra note 28, at 652 (five years for new construction, one year for used
construction; both commencing from the date of conveyance regardless of when discov-
ered); McNamara, supra note 28, at 142 ("a decade of liability should be sufficient" id.);
Young & Harper, supra note 50, at 273 (one year is too short, seventeen and a half years
is too long); Project, supra note 48, at 1086, 1091 (the authors propose a model statutory
scheme including a two-year limitation period which starts to run when the defect is or
should be discovered).
57. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
58. For an excellent discussion of the mechanics and recent expansion of the Home
Owner's Warranty Program (HOW), see Nelson, Why Builders Should Know HOW, 8
REAL EsT. REV. 46 (1978).
59. Note, Extension of Implied Warranties to Developer-Vendors of Completed
New Homes, 11 UIw. L. ANN. 257, 268-69 (1976).
60. See Padula v. J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 298 A.2d 529 (1973), in
which the court adopted an evidentiary test which provided that "whether the house is
9
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of builders' interests with consumer protection suggests the need
for a requirement that defects be substantial. 1
3. Nonbuilder- Vendors' Liability to Subsequent Purchas-
ers.-An issue not before the court in Terlinde is whether a sub-
sequent purchaser can maintain an action against a nonbuilder-
vendor." Strong arguments exist in favor of extending the sub-
sequent purchaser's right of action in implied warranty to ac-
tions against the nonbuilder-vendor. The major distinction be-
tween nonbuilder-vendors and builder-vendors is the latters'
direct participation in the construction process.83 Nonbuilder-
vendors, however, control the selection of the contractors, super-
vise their work, and retain the right to accept the finished prod-
uct as satisfactory for habitation. If construction work is the
source of defects, responsibility can be placed more reasonably
on a party who possessed supervisory authority over the work
than on an innocent purchaser who merely is the unfortunate
discoverer of the defects.
A final justification for extending a subsequent purchaser's
implied warranty rights to actions against nonbuilder-vendors is
the vendor's ability to maintain an action for subrogation
against the contractor. When culpability for latent defects ulti-
mately rests on the contractor, he may be joined as a third-party
defendant in an action against a developer.6 5 Although accept-
ance of nonconforming work by a developer may operate as a
waiver of claims against the contractor,8 this usually is not the
case for defects due to work that is not done in accordance with
a contract.67 Vendors who are aware of their potential liability
for defects can avoid any bar of their subrogation rights by re-
defective is determined by a test of reasonableness and not perfection." Id. at 33, 298
A.2d at 532; accord, Shiffers v. Cunningham Shepard Builders Co., 28 Colo. App. 29, 470
P.2d 593 (1970); see also Note, Builders' Liability, supra note 50, at 623; Note, supra
note 59, at 268.
61. Haskell, supra note 28, at 652.
62. For a discussion of the distinction between a builder-vendor and a nonbuilder-
vendor, see notes 28-32 and accompanying text supra.
63. Notes 28-32 and accompanying text supra.
64. - S.C. at , 271 S.E.2d at 769; 254 S.C. at 414, 175 S.E.2d at 795.
65. See McEachern v. Plauche Lumber & Constr. Co., 200 La. 696, 57 So. 2d 405
(1952); McNamara, supra note 28, at 142.
66. American Institute of Architects, GENERAL CONTONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR
CONSTRUCTION, Appendix E § 9.9.4 (13th ed. 1976).
67. See, e.g., City of Midland v. Waller, 430 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. 1968).
[Vol. 33
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol33/iss1/5
CONTRACTS
fusing to enter into construction contracts with contractors who
demand exculpatory clauses in their favor.
E. Conclusion
Terlinde v. Neely is a sound decision by the South Carolina
Supreme Court in the area of consumer protection. The court
discarded artificial distinctions previously drawn between first
and subsequent purchasers and extended protection from build-
ing defects on an equal basis. Prompt legislative action consis-
tent with this result will remedy any uncertainties created by
the decision and will confirm South Carolina's active leadership
in protecting home buyers.
II. REAL ESTATE LISTING AGREEMENTS BINDING AFTER THE
OwNER's DEATH
In Wilbur Smith & Associates v. National Bank of South
Carolina,8 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that an ex-
clusive listing agreement, which included a clause purporting to
bind the heirs of a property owner, was enforceable against the
executor of the owner's estate. The court affirmed the trial
court's determination that the listing agreement's language was
indicative of an intention on the part of the property owner and
the realtor to execute a contract that would survive the death of
the owner. In order to ascertain the parties' intent, the court
employed a rule of contract construction that sidestepped the
operation of the principle that agency relationships terminate on
the death of either party.
In 1973, DesChamps, at the age of eighty, executed an ex-
clusive listing agreement6 9 authorizing the brokerage firm of
68. 274 S.C. 296, 263 S.E.2d 643 (1980).
69. An exclusive listing agreement is a brokerage contract between an owner and a
realtor under which an owner agrees to pay a realtor a commission if the realtor can
interest a buyer in purchasing the land covered by the agreement. See, P. MECHEM, OUT-
LINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 366 (4th ed. 1952). By entering into an exclusive listing
agreement, an owner relinquishes his own right to sell the property and transfers the
right to the realtor. If the owner sells the land during the term of the agreement, he still
must pay the realtor his commission. E.g., Dorman Realty & Ins. Co., 264 S.C. 94, 98, 212
S.E.2d 591, 593 (1975). This type of agreement must be distinguished from the exclusive
agency contract under which the owner merely is precluded from listing the property
with another realtor. Id. at 98, 212 S.E.2d at 593. Under an exclusive agency contract,
the owner retains the right to sell his property and need not pay a commission if he
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James Cuttino & Sons to sell a 650-acre tract of land. The term
of the agreement was fifteen years, and the sales price was to be
determined upon completion of a feasibility study. The printed
form contract contained a typed addendum: "Above contract
binding on heirs and assigns."70 Upon completion of the feasibil-
ity study, the parties executed a second form contract that set
forth the sales price and reduced the term of the listing agree-
ment to five years. The second agreement contained no reference
to the first agreement and made no mention of heirs and assigns.
DesChamps died before the expiration of the five-year term, and
his executor, the National Bank of South Carolina, sold the
property without Cuttino's assistance but with full knowledge of
the listing agreement.71
In an action by Wilbur Smith & Associates against Des-
Champs' executor and Cuttino to recover for development work
on the property, Cuttino cross-claimed against the executor for
his commission due under the listing agreement. The trial court
granted Cuttino's claim, and the South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that "the contract was valid and binding on
DesChamps' heirs and assigns and the executor. 7 2 In reaching
this result, the court, in effect, broadened substantially the cir-
cumstances under which it will determine that contemporaneous
agreements should be read together and refused to apply a rule
of agency without considering the established exceptions of the
rule.
A. Construction of Contemporaneous Instruments
Faced with two listing agreements, the first purporting to
bind the property owner's heirs and assigns and the second mak-
ing no similar provision, the court resolved the apparent ambi-
guity by relying on Klutts Resort Realty, Inc. v. Down'Round
effectuates a sale without the services of the realtor. Id. at 98, 212 S.E.2d at 593.
70. 274 S.C. at 298, 263 S.E.2d at 644. Wilbur Smith & Associates was hired by
DesChamps and Cuttino to prepare a development study on the potential uses of the
land. The firm prepared an elaborate twenty-four page color brochure that depicted pos-
sible uses of the property including a residential area, a golf course, and an equestrian
center. The brochure was designed to attract investors interested in purchasing and de-
veloping a large tract.
71. Id. at 298, 263 S.E.2d at 644.
72. Id. at 300, 263 S.E.2d at 645.
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Development Corp.73 Affirming the trial court's determination
that the contemporaneous listing agreements should be con-
strued as one contract, the court applied the rule established in
Klutts that effect should be given to provisions in an instrument
if they limit, explain, or otherwise affect a second instrument.'
The court's reliance on Klutts poses several problems.
First, Klutts is factually distinguishable from Wilbur
Smith. Although each of the listing agreements in Wilbur Smith
was a separately enforceable contract, Klutts concerned the con-
struction of a basic contract in conjunction with a separately
executed but incomplete and unenforceable addendum .7  The
court avoided this distinction by finding that language pertinent
to future determination of the sales price in the first agreement
contemplated the execution of the second agreement.7 6 Although
this interpretation is tenable, the court failed to note the lack of
any specific incorporating language in either agreement and did
not consider the possibility that the language merely contem-
plated the insertion of a price term in the first agreement rather
than the execution of a separate contract.
77
The second problem created by the court's reliance on
Klutts becomes evident upon examination of the quoted lan-
guage used by the court as authority for its holding in Wilbur
Smith. This language provides: "[I]f there are any provisions in
one instrument limiting, explaining, or otherwise affecting the
provisions of another, they will be given effect between the par-
ties . ... -7 The court in Wilbur Smith failed to take into ac-
count the limiting nature of the second listing agreement that
arguably restricted the first agreement in three respects: it sup-
plied the omitted sales price of the property; it reduced the du-
ration of the agreement from fifteen years to five years; and it
omitted the provision that bound the heirs of DesChamps.7 ' The
73. 268 S.C. 80, 232 S.E.2d 20 (1977). In Kutts, the court recognized that instru-
ments may be contemporaneous even though not executed simultaneously if they "relate
to the same subject matter and have been entered into by the same parties .... Id. at
88, 232 S.E.2d at 24.
74. 274 S.C. at 299, 263 S.E.2d at 645.
75. See 268 S.C. at 85, 232 S.E.2d at 23.
76. 274 S.C. at 299, 263 S.E.2d at 644.
77. See id. at 299-300, 263 S.E.2d at 644-45.
78. Id. at 299, 263 S.E.2d at 645 (emphasis added) (citing 268 S.C. at 88-89, 232
S.E.2d at 24)(citing 17 AM. Jun. 2d Contracts § 264 (1964)).
79. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
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court did not attempt to identify or explain these limitations.
By relying on the rule of construction set forth in Klutts in
its interpretation of the two listing agreements in Wilbur Smith,
the South Carolina Supreme Court arguably has opened the
door to broader application of the rule in transactions based on
two or more agreements.
B. Continued Existence of a Contractual Agreement Beyond
the Death of a Party
Although the two listing agreements in Wilbur Smith
clearly indicated that the parties intended to enter into a listing
arrangement, it was unclear whether the contract was intended
to survive DesChamps' death and remain enforceable against his
executor. The court reasoned that the language, "[a]bove con-
tract binding on heirs and assigns," indicated that the parties
intended to continue the listing agreement for the entire term
regardless of whether DesChamps survived until the expiration
of the agreement.80 The court concluded that this interpretation
was consistent with the circumstances surrounding the listing
agreement.81 The advanced age of DesChamps, the size of the
tract of land, and the amount of time and money expended by
Cuttino to promote its sale led the court to find that the bro-
ker's contract was "not an ordinary listing agreement entered
into under ordinary circumstances. 8 2 The court assumed that
because Cuttino wished to avoid any possibility of losing his in-
vestment if DesChamps were to die, the parties had contracted
away the operation of the normal rule that listing agreements
terminate on the death of the property owner.83 'Thus, the liabil-
ity of the executor flowed naturally from the exclusive listing
agreement.
8 4
As in other agency relationships, an exclusive listing agree-
ment normally will terminate on the death of the property own-
er, and the real estate agent will not be entitled to recover any
compensation for his services if a sale has not been effectuated
80. 274 S.C. at 300, 263 S.E.2d at 645. See notes 102-06 and accompanying text
infra.
81. 274 S.C. at 301, 263 S.E.2d at 645-46.
82. Id. at 301, 263 S.E.2d at 645.
83. Id. See notes 85-88 and accompanying text infra.
84. 274 S.C. at 302, 263 S.E.2d at 646. See 264 S.C. 94, 212 S.E.2d 591.
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prior to the owner's death.8 5 The rationale behind this rule is
supplied in the comments to Restatement (Second) of Agency
section 120:
Agency is a personal relation, necessarily ending with the death
of the principal; the former principal is no longer a legal person
with whom there can be legal relations. One cannot act on be-
half of a non-existent person. Further, to the extent that
agency is a consensual relation, it cannot exist after the death
or incapacity of the principal.8
Although this rule has generated considerable controversy,
87 it
has persisted over the years and rests on a policy that the princi-
pal's estate should be protected from liability on contracts en-
tered into by an agent whose existence is unknown to the
estate.88
There are, however, several means for avoiding the opera-
tion of the general rule that an agency relationship terminates
on the death of the principal. First, if the authority of an agent
is intertwined with an interest in the subject matter of his
power, the agent is said to have a "power coupled with an inter-
est,"8' 9 which is irrevocable and will not terminate on the death
of the principal.90 The interest must be in the subject matter of
the agency relationship and not merely in the agency contract.91
85. Duin v. Security-First National Bank, 132 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 904, 283 P.2d 790
(19551; Thornton v. Lewis, 106 Ga. App. 328, 126 S.E.2d 869 (1962); Johnston Estate, 16
Pa. D. & C. 2d 706 (1958); Carver v. Morrow, 213 S.C. 199,48 S.E.2d 814 (1948); Ohlandt
v. Craven, 146 S.C. 450, 144 S.E. 162 (1928); Bunch v. Dunning, 106 S.C. 300, 91 S.E. 331
(1917); W. SAvEY, AGENCY § 48 (5th ed. 1973); W. SELL, AGENCY § 223 (1975). RESTATE-
MNT (SECoND) OF AGENCY § 453 (1957) provides: "Unless otherwise agreed, an agent
whose compensation is dependent upon the accomplishment of a specified result is not
entitled to compensation for services rendered in an unsuccessful effort to accomplish
that result before the rightful termination of the agency." W. SEL, supra, at § 223. See
W. SELL, supra, at § 120 (death of the principal terminates an agent's authority); Annot.,
146 A.L.R. 826 (1943).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 120, Comment a (1957).
87. P. MECHEM, supra note 69, at § 288 n.65; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 120, Comment a (1957).
88. See N.Y. LAw REviSION COMM'N REPORT 687 (1939).
89. See W. SELL, supra note 85, at § 229.
90. Hunt v. Rousmanier's Administrators, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 174 (1823); Mubi v.
Broomfield, 108 Ariz. 39, 492 P.2d 700 (1972); Jay v. Dollarhide, 31 Cal. App. 3d 1001, 84
Cal. Rptr. 538 (1970); Cutcliffe v. Chesnut, 126 Ga. App. 378, 190 S.E.2d 800 (1972);
Bowman v. Bowman, 3 Ohio Misc. 161, 210 N.E.2d 920 (1965); McCallum v. Grier, 86
S.C. 162, 68 S.E. 466 (1910); W. SELL, supra note 85, at § 229.
91. Cutcliffe v. Chesnut, 126 Ga. App. at 382, 190 S.E.2d at 803.
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The typical exclusive listing agreement, therefore, does not come
under the "power coupled with an interest" exception and nor-
mally will terminate on the death of the property owner.92
A second device that avoids the normal consequences of the
death of a property owner rests on an agent's claim of full per-
formance prior to termination.93 To reach this result, an override
clause, which protects an agent who has performed as agreed but
who may be deprived of his commission because of matters be-
yond his control, must appear in the listing agreement. The
override clause entitles a real estate agent to his commission if
the property is sold after the expiration of the listing agreement
to a buyer procured by the agent during the term of the agree-
ment.94 The property owner's death thus does not effect termi-
nation of the agency relationship because the relationship al-
ready has been ended by the expiration of the agreement.9 5 This
method for avoiding the effects of termination is not applicable
to the facts of Wilbur Smith because the term of the listing
agreement was still in effect at DesChamps' death." The su-
preme court, however, placed considerable emphasis on Cut-
tino's performance under the contract prior to and after the
death of DesChamps. 7
The final method for avoiding termination of a listing agree-
ment on the death of the owner was used in Wilbur Smith: the
inclusion of an express provision to that effect in the agreement.
Because DesChamps and Cuttino included the provision
92. For example, under an exclusive listing agreement similar to the one in Wilbur
Smith, a realtor is authorized to find a prospective purchaser for the property, and his
interest lies in the commission he will receive upon successful performance. This is not
an interest in the subject matter of the agency (the property listed) but rests in the
agency itself as a form of compensation. See Kirchof v. Friedman, 10 Ariz. App. 220, 457
P.2d 760 (1969); Maddox v. District Supply, Inc., 222 Md. 31, 158 A.2d 650 (1960);
George H. Rucker & Co. v. Glenna, 130 Va. 511, 107 S.E. 725 (1921); W. SELL, supra note
85, at § 229.
93. See Hentges v. Wolff, 240 Minn. 517, 61 N.W.2d 748 (1953); In re Estate of
Lease, 62 Wis. 2d 230, 214 N.W.2d 418 (1974). But cf. Parker v. Compton, 511 S.W.2d
708 (Tenn. App. 1973), discussed in 42 TENN. L. REv. 405 (1975).
94. See note 93 supra.
95. See In re Estate of Lease, 62 Wis. 2d at 239, 214 N.W.2d at 423.
96. The listing agreement, however, did contain an override clause that provided:
"Should the herein listed property be sold within 60 days after the expiration of the
contract to anyone to whom said agent has previously offered it, I agree to pay James
Cuttino & Sons the above stipulated commission on the sales price." Record at 4-A.
97. 274 S.C. at 302, 263 S.E.2d at 646.
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"[a]bove contract binding on heirs and assigns" in their first
agreement, the court was willing to circumvent the normal rule
of termination and bind the executor of DesChamps' estate."
Furthermore, because DesChamps was not required to perform
any unique personal services under the agreement, his estate
was not prevented by impossibility from completing the con-
tract.99 Nevertheless, despite the executor's ability to carry out a
listing agreement, there is some authority for the proposition
that parties are not free to contract away the termination of an
agency relationship by death because termination of agency
arises by operation of law.100 The supreme court did not consider
this at great length and concluded instead that the issue was
controlled by the manifested intent of the parties to bind the
estate of DesChamps and his heirs if he were to die before the
agreement had expired.101
Although the use of only seven words to avoid the operation
of an established principle of law might be applauded as a tri-
umph of legal draftsmanship and a victory for simplicity in the
law, its raises certain problems that were not given full treat-
ment by the court in Wilbur Smith. If the rationale and policy
considerations behind the termination rule are sound, 2 it seems
only reasonable to conclude that, absent unequivocal language
expressly negating its operation, the rule, when applicable,
should be given effect.
98. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
99. An executory contract that calls for the promisor to perform a personal service
will not survive his death because of impossibility. 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1335
(1962); L. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS § 177 (2d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 282 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1974); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 459 (1932).
100. See Weaver v. Richards, 144 Mich. 395, 108 N.W. 382 (1906) (stipulation in a
power of attorney that the death of the principal will not revoke power is not binding);
P. MECHEM, OUTLINES ON AGENCY § 208 (3d ed. 1923); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 120, Comment a (1957)("An agreement that an agency should continue after the death
of the principal is a legal impossibility.") Id. Illustrations 2-3; id. § 59, Comment b (au-
thority may be terminated by death, regardless of the original manifestation of the
principal).
101. 274 S.C. at 301, 263 S.E.2d at 645. The court stated that it was routine practice
to bind one's heirs in dispositions of real estate, yet no authority was cited. Id. at 302,
263 S.E.2d at 646. The defendant admitted in oral argument that it was legally possible
to draft a listing agreement that would bind the heirs of a property owner to carry out a
sale with a realtor. Id. at 300, 263 S.E.2d at 645. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 376 (1957) which provides: "The existence and extent of the duties of the agent to the
principal are determined by the terms of the agreement between the parties. . .
102. See notes 86-88 and accompanying text supra.
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Furthermore, the phrase "heirs and assigns" is' misplaced in
the listing agreement. This phrase traditionally is employed only
as a linguistic device in deeds used to convey an estate in fee.103
It is unclear whether the words apply to the executor or admin-
istrator of the owner's estate or only to a devisee or intestate
successor of the owner. The court, however; found no problems
with this uncertainty, noting that "[tihe executor took charge of
the property subject to its burden and was bound the same as
any 'heirs and assigns.' ,4 Yet, the relationships of an executor
to the property of a decedent and that of an heir to the same
property differ completely: one manages the property as a fiduci-
ary; the other owns it outright. It is possible, moreover, that this
ambiguous phrase could be extended to include other relation-
ships even more remote. For example, if the probate court had
been forced to sell the property in order to pay the debts of the
estate, the supreme court might have found that "heirs and as-
signs" included the probate court, which would then be liable to
Cuttino for his commission.105 The implications of the phrase
are enormous. The use of ambiguous phrases susceptible of
interpretive extension should not be encouraged by the court,
especially when their use may contravene a rational legal
principle. 106
C. Conclusion
There are no ultimate answers to questions concerning the
proper construction given to an ambiguous agreement. Courts
must use whatever tools are available in order to ascertain the
intentions of the contracting parties. Wilbur Smith testifies to
the proposition that vague draftsmanship breeds litigation.
Nevertheless, enforcement of ambiguous agreements may lend a
stamp of approval to their continued existence. Faced with a
choice between applying a well-established, rational rule of law
103. Brief of Appellant at 5-6. See W. BuRBY, REAL PROPERTY 201-03 (3d ed. 1965);
C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION To THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 3 (1962).
104. 274 S.C. at 302, 263 S.E.2d at 646.
105. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-920 (1976).
106. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
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and pursuing a haphazard search for intent to avoid that rule, a
court is better advised to choose the former and avoid the prob-
lematic consequences of the latter.
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